This paper provides experimental evidence on the e¤ect of "informed" town hall meetings on electoral support for programmatic, non-clientelist platforms. The experiment takes place in Benin and involves real candidates running in the …rst round of the 2006 presidential elections. The treatment is a campaign strategy based exclusively on town hall meetings during which policy proposals made by candidates are "speci…c" and informed by empirical research. The control is the "standard" strategy based on campaign rallies followed by targeted or clientelist electoral promises. We …nd that the treatment has a positive e¤ect on self-perceived knowledge about policies and candidates. The data also suggests a positive e¤ect of the treatment on turnout and electoral support for the candidates participating in the experiment. The results suggest that new democracies may contain electoral clientelism by institutionalizing the use of both town hall meetings in electoral campaigns and policy expertise in the design of electoral platforms.
INTRODUCTION
Broad public goods such as public education and universal health care play a crucial role in promoting economic development. 1 But, electoral promises to provide such goods are ine¤ective. By contrast, targeted redistribution and clientelism are bad for development, but they are quite e¤ective in generating electoral support. 2 Wantchekon (2003) provides experimental evidence on factors that reduce the electoral appeal of such clientelist platforms: gender, ethnic solidarity and access to information. He …nds that women, voters from same ethnic group as the candidate and those with better media access tend to be more receptive to public good platforms. But the paper proposes no solution, no alternative to clientelism.
The literature in economics and political science has similar shortcomings. Most scholars tend to assume the impossibility of any real alternative to clientelism, at least in the short run. Lemarchand (1972) and van de Walle (2007) view clientelist practices as the re ‡ection of agrarian social relations and ethnic cleavages that will persist, unless these relations evolve and become more impersonal and these cleavages become less politically salient. 3 For Keefer (2007) , clientelism dominates in new democracies because political parties have not been around long enough to overcome the credibility gap associated with the broad based public goods promises. They make clientelist promises because it is easier for voters to believe these than promises to deliver public goods. Implicitly, clientelist practices can recede only when democratic institutions are old enough and politicians have interacted long enough with voters to boost their credibility.
There is a clear parallel between these structural arguments about the persistence of clientelist practices and modernization theory. According to modernization theory, democratization becomes possible only when countries reach a su¢ ciently high level of economic development. A similar argument in our context would be that non-clientelist or programmatic politics can appear only when countries reach a su¢ ciently high level of political development. Przeworski et al (1997) have shown that democratization is possible at low levels of economic development so long as key political actors choose the "right" strategies.
1 See Keefer and Khemani [2003] for a discussion of the role of broad public goods in reducing poverty.
See also St-Paul and Verdier [1993] for the e¤ect of public education on growth and López-Casasnovas et al [2005 ] , Sala-I-Martin [2002] , Howitt [2005] for a survey of the literature on health and development.
2 See Wantchekon (2003) , Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , Alesina, Baquir and Easterly (1999) 3 See Kitschelt Herbert and Steven Wilkinson ( 2007) for a general survey.
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Analogously, we aim to show that programmatic politics are possible even in presence of "backward" social relations and strong ethnic cleavages. This may happen if, for instance, voters and politicians's expectations are "properly" aligned so that public goods promises become more credible. We therefore need to identify campaign strategies that would shape voters 'expectations about politician future actions.
We believe that …nding and empirically testing these strategies is crucial to current debates on clientelism. First, such results would give more prominence to the idea that clientelism is, in large part, driven by political circumstances rather than by structural factors.
Second, these …ndings would provide badly needed practical guidance on how to overcome political obstacles to policy-making in developing countries. 4 . Third, if clientelism and low development are mutually reinforcing as the literature suggests, this would mean that developing countries are "trapped" in a bad political economic equilibrium: low development strengthens clientelist politics, which lowers development even further. In the absence of exogenous structural shocks that could change the nature of this equilibrium, the only way to break the clientelist trap is to introduce strategies that shape expectations of voters and of politicians in a way that makes public goods platforms electorally e¤ective.
In this paper, we propose and experimentally test such strategy: electoral campaigns based on town hall meetings, led by "expert-designed" and speci…c policy promises. We …nd that such strategies have a positive e¤ect on some measures of voter information, turnout and electoral support for the candidate running the experiment. Given the data limitations of the study, there is a possibility that the positive e¤ect of the treatment on turnout and voting was due to chance. But these results represent a sharp contrast with the results of the 2001 experiments where public goods platforms were found to have a negative and signi…cant e¤ect on electoral support for the candidate running the experiment. We conclude that political parties can overcome the need to win votes through targeted policies or even through the distribution of largesse to a set of voters by improving the extent to which their policy promises are informed by empirical policy research. To put it di¤erently, policy targeting and policy speci…city may be substitutes. One may contain electoral clientelism by institutionalizing the use of both town hall meetings in electoral campaigns and policy expertise in the design of electoral platforms.
One important question arising from the result is whether the e¤ect is mostly driven by the information content of the platform or by institution of the town-hall meeting. In 4 See Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000) and Bardhan (2002) 
Relation with the literature
There have been several studies in contemporary political science that provide empirical evidence of the e¤ect of increased policy knowledge and various forms of public deliberation on political behavior. The political ignorance literature in American politics indicates that increased policy information a¤ects policy preferences and voting behavior. In particular, Gilens [2001] …nds that the dissemination of facts about crime rates and foreign aid have a signi…cant e¤ect on policy preferences and political judgments. However, the results generated in these studies are based on US data and it is unclear if the information e¤ect would transcend ethnic or religious cleavages, or if the e¤ect would be of the same magnitude given the low level of formal education in most developing countries. 7
The deliberative democracy literature (Gutman and Thompson [1996] and Fishkin [1997] among others) …nd that public deliberation promotes "enlightenment", consensus, and civic engagement. One limitation of this literature is that it is mostly theoretical and the evidence that it provides comes from deliberative polls and focus groups, rather than from the …eld.
5 Austin Smith and Federson (2008) 6 This contrasts with Keefer and Vlacu (2008) who suggests that credibility comes with age of party politics. 7 See also Bartels [1996] and Delli Carpini Michael and Scott Keeter [1996] .
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As a result, it is unclear how policy information provided in the context of public deliberation would a¤ect voting behavior in real elections.
A key to our theoretical framework is that speci…c platforms and village discussions in town hall setting make public goods promises more credible because benchmarks are clear and voters can coordinate to punish candidates in future elections. This argument relates to the literature on voter coordination, which describes situations where voters have heterogeneous expectations about the future election outcomes 8 . The paper also relates to models of information revelation in committee debates in the presence of individuals'private preferences. 9 But in the voter coordination literature, coordination is shaped by expectations about future elections, not the information content of platforms and the outcome of public discussion of these platforms. In addition, the information revelation literature is mostly theoretical and is applied to decision-making in committees, not to voting in large elections.
The paper also contributes to the literature on access to information, political institutions, and local public goods. Olken [2008] provides experimental evidence from Indonesia that suggests that direct elections are better than representative-based meetings in generating popular satisfaction and support for local public goods. Reinikka and Svensson [2005 ] …nd that media access reduces local capture of public funds and subsequently leads to higher school enrollment and test scores. However, these studies focus on local public goods and ignore political incentives at the national level.
The methodology, the context, and the results of the Benin experiment reported in Wantchekon [2003] are particularly relevant to the current study. That experiment aimed at testing the e¤ectiveness of clientelist versus programmatic electoral campaigns on voting.
The experiment consisted of randomized trials in 24 villages in which politicians used either a clientelist, programmatic, or neutral election campaign. The results suggested that the clientelist electoral campaign is most e¤ective, and that the programmatic election campaign costs votes. However, women, more informed voters, and co-ethnics of the candidate running the experiment were more responsive to programmatic platforms than men, less informed voters, and non co-ethnics (respectively). One question that arises from that study is whether clientelism is the only e¤ective electoral campaign strategy. Indeed, it could well be the case that the lack of electoral support for programmatic platforms compared to clientelist platforms was due to its use of overly general or vague campaign messages such 8 See. Melbane (2000) and Melbane and Seckon (2002), Cox (1997) In addition, the …rst four years of democracy under a technocratic Soglo government and a programmatic "Renaissance du Benin Party" were characterized by a high growth rate (6.2% from 1990 to 1994) and good governance indicators. 13 The move away from relatively programmatic to much more clientelist politics started with the 1996 campaign that led to the return to power (by the means of democratic elections) of the former dictator Mathieu Kerekou. He won by capitalizing on accusations that his opponent was undermining democratic pluralism, and by promising smaller parties better access to government. In short, programmatic politics dominated in the …rst post-transition election because there was a strong demand for market reforms, and because the top candidate in that election was an experienced technocrat and a credible and competent reformer. Clientelism dominated from 1996 to 2006 when Kerekou needed it to reward members of the broad coalition of small parties that brought him back to power in 1996. Thus programmatic and clientelist politics are strategic choices driven by electoral circumstances.
However, better governance under Soglo seemed to have come at the expense of democratic pluralism, and better democratic pluralism under Kerekou came at the expense of good governance. 14 The goal of this experiment is to propose a set of conditions under which one might have good governance and democratic pluralism.
The 2006 presidential elections were the …rst since 1990 without the traditional "big men"
Kerekou and Soglo. They were ineligible to run under the age limits and term limits set by the constitution. There were twenty-six candidates competing in the election, but only four were serious contenders capable of securing more than two percent of the vote. The top two candidates were Yayi Boni, a former President of the West African Development Bank, running as an independent candidate but supported by a coalition of small parties 1 2 If it had not boycotted the national conference, the Parti Communiste du Benin (PCB), a hardline communist party, would have been one of the top parties. 1 3 See Wantchekon and Ngomo [2001] . 1 4 To put it di¤erently, economic indicators were much better under Soglo than they were under Kerekou, but "freedom indices"were higher under Kerekou than they were under Soglo. Democratique (PRD).
The experiment followed a randomized block design with treatments being assigned to 12 randomly selected subunits (villages), in 12 randomly chosen units (electoral districts) in the population, which consists mostly of stronghold districts in Benin that are dominated by the four experimental candidates i.e. the candidates participating in the experiment.
The selection process is as follows:
Denote by N s the number of electoral districts controlled by candidate s 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g ;
where candidate s is an experimental candidate. Then N = P N s is the total number of electoral districts involved in the experiment. Within each electoral district j, there are n j villages. The randomization process consists of the following four steps:
Step 1. There are 77 districts in the country. Candidate s or a party endorsing s randomly draws 1 to 3 districts (say j, k and/or l) out of N s districts, depending on the size of N s
Step 2. There are on average 50 villages per commune in the country. Candidate s randomly draws one village from the n j villages in district j and randomly draws one village from the n k villages in district k, and assigns the village picked to treatment.
Step 3. Among the n j 1 remaining villages in district j and the n k 1 remaining villages in district k; the candidate removes from the pool those villages that are contiguous or in the immediate vicinity of the village picked in stage 2. Then draws randomly two to three villages from the remaining villages in districts j and k: The two or three villages picked serve as the comparison group. For the geographic locations of the participating districts and villages, see the the Benin Map in appendix.
Once the assignment of electoral districts to treatment and control groups was completed, there were pre-electoral surveys on the policy priorities of voters in the treatment units. Finally, teams of campaign workers were instructed with speci…c policy responses to voters'
concerns about the quality of public schools, youth employment, malaria prevention, etc.
They were also given speci…c instructions on how to run the town meetings: First, they introduce themselves and the candidate they are representing. Next, they give a …fteen minute speech on the key problems facing the country and the speci…c solution suggested by the candidate. The speech triggers an open debate in which the issues raised are contextualized, and the proposals made are amended by the participants. The meeting would last between ninety minutes and about two hours. The teams would run six to ten such meetings over two weeks in each village. There were about 50 to 200 participants in each town meeting, and treated villages ranged from 360 to 2,926 inhabitants. In our estimation, about 70% of the population of each village attended one or more town meetings. 17 While villages in treatment groups received and deliberated over informed and broadbased policy proposals, villages in the control groups received a mixture of targeted or clientelist campaign promises as well as very few broad but less informed policy promises.
Indeed, a typical campaign event in Benin is a festive rally where cash and gifts are distributed. The rally is punctuated by short meetings during which surrogates of the candidate make predominantly targeted electoral promises. 18
There were no major di¤erences between treatment and control groups in terms of exposure to and intensity of political campaigns. In each group and each village there were eight to ten meetings, and campaign workers in the treatment group had about the same level of education as those in control villages (about two years of college). 19 After the elections, we collected at the relevant sites, data on turnout in treatment and control precincts with the help of representatives of the National Electoral Commission. We also surveyed a representative sample in each group on demographic variables (age, gender, marital status and ethnic a¢ liation), socioeconomic variables (educational attainment, economic activities, and assets) and political variables (preferences over candidates and voting behavior). The survey data covers all districts except To¤o.
IV. THE DATA AND THE RESULTS

INTERNAL VALIDITY AND COMPLIANCE
We …rst verify the e¤ectiveness of randomization in generating balanced covariates. More precisely, we test the null hypothesis of no signi…cant di¤erence between the means of pre-treatment variables in the treatment group and the control group. We focus on the following covariates: ethnic ties, education level, media use, gender, and age. The selection of these covariates is motivated by the results of the 2001 Benin experiments indicating a signi…cant conditional e¤ect of gender, ethnic a¢ liation, education, access to media, and public goods treatment on voting. Table 1A indicates that there is no signi…cant di¤erence between the means of these variables in the treatment and the control groups, except for education and to a lesser degree newspaper readership. In other words, voters in treatment groups are, on average, more educated than those in the control group. But there is no signi…cant di¤erence in terms of gender, age, ethnic ties, and media use. Therefore, in estimating the treatment e¤ect, we need at least to control for education.
Insert Table 1A here
Next, as a check of internal validity, we investigate whether voters exposed through public deliberation to expert policy information were less involved in clientelist practices. Indeed, one of the terms of the contract between IREEP (the institute running the experiment) and the candidates participating in the experiment was that while T-shirts and calendars could be distributed to voters in treatment villages as in all other villages, there would be no cash distributions by them in the treatment villages. Thus, a further test of internal validity would be whether treated voters were less likely to receive cash from candidates than untreated voters. However, there is a much smaller di¤erence across groups in terms of those who received T-shirts (2.0% to 2.1%), or calendars (7.2% to 7.27%). 21
VOTER INFORMATION
We …rst evaluate the e¤ect of the treatment on a measure of voter information. First, note that a signi…cantly larger number of respondents in the treatment group described the 2 0 Other candidates who are part of the experiment in the district can distribute cash to their supporters.
This may explain why some voters in treatment villages did receive cash. 2 1 Given the pledge by the experimental candidates to restrain from clientelist practices in treatment villages, there was lower supply of cash in treatment villages.
campaign as informative, in comparison with the control group (65.6% in the treatment group as opposed to 58.9% in the control group). Thus, the treatment was e¤ective in making treated subjects believe they were more informed than those who were not treated.
The results clearly highlight the contrast between treatment and control villages. Both types of villages were given very similar levels of attention by the parties, as evidenced by the proportion of voters who received T-shirts and calendars in each group. However, voters in treated villages received less cash and were better informed than voters in control villages.
Insert Table 1B here
In the post-election survey, voters were asked the following three questions: (1) Did the campaign give you information about the quality of the candidates? (2) Did the campaign
give you information about government and how it functions? (3) Did the campaign give you information about the problems facing the country?
The question that best captures the concept of voter information is the one on the problems facing the country and to a less degree the one on the quality of the candidates.
Information on governments is a measure of the level of civic education rather than a measure of voter information. Thus, we will focus our attention on (1) and (3).
We test for the treatment e¤ect on voter information, by using the following probit model.
where Y ij is a categorical variable that takes the value of one if individual j in village i provides a positive response to questions (1), (2) and (3), and zero otherwise; z ij is the vector of individual characteristics for individual j in village i, and T i is the categorical variable for treatment in village i: The vector z ij includes variables such as age, gender, level of educational attainment, ethnic ties with the candidate, and media access. Income level was measured by using an index of housing quality, constructed from factor analysis of …ve independent variables (roo…ng, ground, number of rooms, etc.). The key independent variable is T i , the treatment, which takes the value of one if the respondent was in the treatment group and zero if the respondent was in the control group.
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In each speci…cation we present the results without any controls, then we control for the two covariates that are not balanced between treatment and control groups (i.e. education and media access). Finally, we control for all potentially relevant covariates. Tables 2A, 2B, Insert Tables 2A and 2B here
We now turn to the variable measuring how e¤ective the campaign was in informing voters about government and its functions. Table 2C suggests that the treatment did not have any e¤ect in any of the speci…cations. However, as expected the education coe¢ cient is positive and signi…cant. In contrast to voter information, the media coe¢ cient is positive and signi…cant, which indicates that media access plays a more meaningful role in civic education than in campaign information.
Insert Table 2C The result on self-perceived knowledge about government is very much expected since the campaign provides virtually no information about government. The goal of the experiment was to inform voters about the candidates'programmes, not about the internal structure of the government.
In summary, the treatment makes the electoral process more transparent, and voters better informed or simply better citizens. For proponents of deliberative democracy and those who care about the quality and quantity of political participation, this should be the ultimate prize of our political experiment (Habermas [1996] and Lupia [2008] ). The results clearly indicate that deliberation in the form of town hall meetings is relevant for citizenship not only in localized policy debates as in Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell, (2002) , but also in the context of real elections, when the stakes are very high. We make this point more transparent in this next section by investigating the e¤ect of the treatment on turnout
TURNOUT
Turnout is a fundamental variable of interest in the study of democracy and political participation that has generated a great deal of interest in experimental political science.
Gerber and Green [2000 and 2003] found that canvassing and face-to-face voter mobilization stimulates turnout in various types of elections. In this paper, we …nd that deliberative campaign strategies can improve civic engagement in the form of higher turnout.
The turnout data was collected at various voting booths immediately after all the votes were counted. We collected the results from eight districts involved in the experiment. 22 As we mentioned earlier, the data on electoral behavior originated from a survey that took place …ve days after the election. Table 3 suggests that turnout was signi…cantly higher in treatment villages than in control villages, in seven out of the eight districts. There is only one case (the district of Comè) in which the treatment village (70%) has a smaller turnout than the control village (77%).
Insert Table 3 In other words, under a variety of background conditions (e.g. rural versus urban districts, Muslim versus Christian districts, etc.), and under a variety of platforms generated by the assigned treatment, we …nd that the expert-led deliberative campaign generated increased turnout by an average of 7.3%. The total number of registered voters in the electorate was 3,917,865. This means that there would have been on average 286,004 more voters at the polls, if the experiment were run in all 77 communes in the country.
The conventional wisdom in comparative politics is that clientelism and vote-buying are the only reliable way to drive voters to the polls (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes [2004] .
Banegas (2003) has gone further and presented clientelist redistribution as a form of civic virtue and a decisive factor in voter turnout. In sharp contrast with these claims, more voters went to the polls in treatment groups than in the control groups (81% to 73.87%) despite the fact that fewer of them received any largesse from the political parties during the campaign (16% to 21%). An estimated 5.5% of the electorate received cash and did not vote, and 68% of the electorate voted despite not receiving cash. In addition, the evidence suggests that an informed or treated voter who did not receive cash was much more likely to turnout to vote than a voter who received cash but was less informed (68% to 15.3% of registered voters). In other words, information is clearly a more powerful tool in driving voters to the polls than monetary incentives. Therefore, if it could be cheaply provided, information might be a more cost-e¤ective way of mobilizing voters than cash-distribution. Table 4A uses data collected from the electoral commission on the outcome of the election in treatment and control villages. Overall, the experimental candidates garnered 66.7% of the vote in the treatment villages, compared with 60.7% in the control villages. In one commune (Kandi) the results were approximately the same for the experimental and control villages. In four out of seven cases, the experimental candidate gained more votes in the treatment villages, with the treatment e¤ect being particularly strong in Gadome I and Yaoui.
VOTING
However, in two districts out of seven the experimental candidates fared better in the control villages. For instance, in Kouande, the experimental candidate gained a slightly higher percentage of votes in the control versus treatment group. This may be explained by an unexpected rally by the candidate participating in the experiment in that district, Yayi Boni, just two days before the election. There were no such rallies in any other district participating in the experiment.
Insert Table 4A here There are three districts that took part in the experiment that are missing from Table   4A because we could not get an accurate vote count from these districts on election day (Abomey Calavi, So Ava and Zagnanado). In these districts, the participating political party was Renaissance du Benin and the experimental candidate was Lehadi Soglo. In sharp contrast with the other experimental candidates, Soglo was the underdog in each district. Table 4B presents the vote shares of the candidate using the post-election surveys.
The results are strikingly similar to the one described in Table 4A . In two districts (So Ava and Abomey Calavi) the treatment e¤ect is positive and in one district (Zangnanado) the e¤ect is negative. Thus there is a strong indication that the average treatment e¤ect would have remained positive had we included the three missing districts.
Insert Table 4B here Finally, the fact that the e¤ect of the information treatment in the 2006 experiment bears strong similarities to the clientelist treatment e¤ect of the 2001 experiment suggests that expert information could be a reliable substitute to or possible "cure"to clientelism.
As an alternative test for the treatment e¤ect on voting, we use the probit model presented in Section IV. But here, Y ij is a categorical variable that takes the value of one if individual j in village i votes for the "experimental"candidate in the 2006 election and zero otherwise. Table 4C indicates that the treatment has no e¤ect on voting behavior, which is quite surprising given the results described in Table 4A and 4B. This is probably due to the fact that the post-election survey data was collected a week after the election and two days after the results were announced. Yayi Boni, the main experimental candidate, won the …rst round of the election by ten points, and it is likely that respondents in areas where he did less well might have exaggerated their electoral support for him after learning the results.
For instance, in the districts where we ran the experiment, Yayi's vote share is 31%
higher in the post-election survey than in the election-day vote count. Thus, if he were to do better in treatment areas than in control areas on election day, this margin would be much narrower after the results were announced. It is therefore safe to conclude that the results in Table 4C underestimated the e¤ect of the treatment on voting behavior.
However, we …nd that, as one would expect, voting is positively correlated to ethnic ties, but negatively correlated with education, which is puzzling. Finally, the treatment e¤ect conditional on the respondent having access to the media is negative and signi…cant at 90% level. Thus, the e¤ect of the media on voting is marginally negative for those who were treated and strongly positive for those who were not, which means that treatment may help overcome inequalities in access to information.
Insert Table 4C The question arising from the results described in section IV is whether the estimated treatment e¤ect is driven by the information content of platforms or by the fact they were delivered through town hall meeting. This section draws from Atchade and Wantchekon (2009) and tries to estimate the pure town hall meeting e¤ect.
Estimating the Town Hall Meeting E¤ect
The Town Hall meeting e¤ect is di¢ cult to pin down because there is no treatment group where speci…c programmatic platforms were delivered at rallies. 24 Instead, we have groups (.i.e. the control groups) that were exposed to clientelist platforms at rallies. Because of this missing data problem, we make three fairly reasonable assumptions that help to assess the e¤ect of town hall meetings. 25 The …rst assumption is that clientelist platforms presented in control villages were "speci…c." This assumption means that the only real di¤erence between the platforms in treatment groups and those in control groups was that one was more programmatic and focused on the problems of the country and the other was more targeted and focused on the problems of the village. This is a standard assumption in the clientelist literature (see Keefer and Vlacu (2007) ).
The second assumption is that, when delivered at rallies, speci…c clientelist platforms when there is town hall meeting, i.e.Z = 1 and the platforms were amended by voters, i.e. D = 1. The goal is to estimate = E (Y (1; 0) Y (0)), the intrinsic town meeting e¤ect.
As we mentioned earlier, the drawback of the experiment is that neither participation to town meetings nor the proceedings of the debates (which de…ne D) were systematically recorded. But, as we mentioned earlier, this is not a problem here since town hall meetings do not signi…cantly alter the candidates'platforms. Therefore, D is always 0:
Denote Y ? (0) the outcome variable in control groups. Since the clientelist campaign message in a control groups is di¤erent from the treatment group message, we assume that
which captures the fact that, at rallies, speci…c clientelist platforms would work better than speci…c programmatic platforms. We have
In the case where Y (1; 0) is the voting outcome as discussed in section IV., ? = EY (1; D)
Y ? (0)) is simply the estimated treatment e¤ect presented in Table 2B , which indicates that the treatment has no e¤ect on voting behavior. The value of ? is a lower bound on = E (Y (1; 0) Y (0)), which is a measure the town hall e¤ect. Thus, the e¤ect is stronger than the "no e¤ect" result in Table 2B . From this result, we conclude that, at the very least, Town Hall meetings are highly likely to have positive e¤ect on electoral support for candidate running the experiment.
V. EXTERNAL VALIDITY
Randomized evaluation is strong on the quality of causal identi…cation (internal validity), but weak on generalizability (external validity), i.e. whether the results are robust to changes in the background conditions of the experiment. According to Rodrik [2008] , a reasonable step towards improving external validity is to make the target population more representative and the theoretical foundations of the experiment more explicit, as well as incorporating as much variation in the covariates as possible. We now explain the way in which the current experiment deals with these issues, in particular, representativeness of the target population and variation in the background conditions.
First, the districts involved in this experiment were drawn from all provinces, and as a result, from all major ethno-linguistic groups of the country (Atakora-Donga, BorgouAlibori, Zou-Collines, Oueme-Plateau, Atlantic-Littoral and Oume-Plateau). In the 2001 experiment, neither Oueme Plateau nor Atakora-Donga were represented. Thus, the current population under treatment is more representative in terms of social and demographic conditions.
Second, while in the 2001 experiment only strongholds were selected, in this study we included two districts (Come and Tanguieta) that was expected to be competitive. Remarkably, the experimental candidate in these districts complied with the experimental protocol despite the obvious risk associated with running an experimental campaign in a competitive political environment. It is also remarkable that the risk seemed to have paid o¤: in: Come for instance, the candidate had a much larger voter share (+14%) in treated village than in the non-treated villages.
Third, while in the 2001 experiment all candidates were expected to win at least 60% of the vote locally, the current experiment incudes three districts out of twelve where the experimental candidate, namely Soglo, was the underdog. We …nd that the average treatment e¤ect was positive not only with the candidates favored to win, but also with the underdog.
Because the current project covers more regions than the previous experiment, there was more variation in terms of background conditions. There are districts with large Christian by the fact that it involved real candidates competing in real elections. The very fact that candidates agree to run such an experiment is an indication that the treatment is fairly realistic, and responds to electoral incentives. If, besides being realistic, the treatment is proven to be electorally e¤ective, it will be more much more likely to be adopted by politicians in future elections.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
We show that a two-stage public deliberation over policies led by experts can improve electoral support for those policies. The candidates could win more votes from the electorate if they were to switch from the standard campaign message to platforms informed by research and best practice and chose to communicate these platforms through town meetings. If a given policy is known by voters and politicians to be both welfare improving and electorally e¤ective, then that policy is more likely to be adopted by politicians as electoral platforms in future elections, and more likely to be implemented once the politician is in o¢ ce. Therefore, one should take advantage of advances in liberal democracy and the improved political autonomy of civil society in Africa, to push for institutional change that allows for more public deliberation over policy choice and better use of expert policy information generated by academics and development agencies. This is because, as we show in this paper, town meetings informed by serious policy research can help improve civic engagement and electoral support for good governance, and hence make the selection and implementation of "good" policies more likely. One may achieve this goal by institutionalizing the generation and use of expert policy information by parties, governments, and civil society organizations.
It might therefore be helpful to set up in Benin and perhaps other African countries, a "council of experts", a permanent and independent academic institution to advise and assist political parties and the government in designing and evaluating policies, and in setting development priorities. This institution could bear some similarities to the Intergovernmen- Institutionalizing the use of expert information is at the heart of Chinese economic reforms. According to Ravallion (2008: 2) , the guiding principle of these reforms was the idea that public action should be based on evaluations of experiences with di¤erent policies. As a result, in 1978 the Chinese Communist Party set up a research group that studied local experiments on the decollectivization of farming. The results of these local policy experiments helped convince national policy makers of the merits of scaling up these policies.
The idea of a council of experts as an institutional response to policy failure in democ- This rather wild proposal, which was treated as a joke by television audiences across the country, has the merit of pointing quite seriously to the role of "expert"knowledge in democratic politics and the bene…ts of institutionalizing non-partisan policy expertise.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A …eld experiment was conducted in Benin to investigate the e¤ect of an expert-led deliberative campaign on political behavior. We …nd that the campaign or the treatment has a positive e¤ect on a self-reported measure voter information, turnout, and voting for the candidate running the experiment. We use the result to provide an empirical justi…cation for the creation of "councils of experts"that would systematically evaluate policy initiatives, advise local and national governments, political parties and civil society organizations, and lead public discussions around election times, or other critical junctures of national policy-making. We argue that by engaging voters and political actors, councils of experts would not only help create an electoral constituency for good governance, but also improve transparency and accountability in governments.
The results lend some support to our earlier claim that clientelism is driven by political conditions, namely the transparency of programmatic platforms and by town-meetings.
The result might have been di¤erent if voters or clients were economically dependant on local patrons, as in agrarian societies with powerful landed elites such as in Latin American countries. In that case, the clientelist equilibrium may have been more robust and the e¤ect of the information treatment less e¤ective.
There are several directions for future research. In terms of experimental studies of clientelism, we plan to improve the external validity of our …ndings by replicating the experiment in other African countries and in the context of other types of elections, such legislative or municipal elections. We also plan to further explore theoretically the role of expert information, and of other institutional arrangements, in reducing clientelism and improving e¢ ciency in the provision of public goods. Note: *signi…cant at 10%; **signi…cant at 5%; ***signi…cant at 1 % 
